

3. Naturally we hope that things will not come to this pass, and it may be that the influence of the Arab Governments and of other friendly countries will restrain Qasim. We are sending an immediate message to the Arab Governments of the area and to those of India, Pakistan and Turkey asking them to use any influence they have to restrain Qasim. As we have no relations with Saudi Arabia, would you please urge King Saud to throw his weight in also in favour of restraint?

4. We are very conscious of the United Nations angle on this and the Security Council will clearly have to be seized of the matter if the Iraqi threat develops further. Kuwait is not yet a member of the United Nations and there might be advantage in action being initiated by another Arab Government. We have been wondering whether Saudi Arabia would be the right one for this role. We may consult the Ruler of Kuwait about this. There may be an awkward problem of timing in this connection, since we would not wish an approach to the Security Council to prevent us from taking the necessary precautionary action in Kuwait. We are consulting our mission in New York on this question, and no doubt they will consult yours.

### 73. Editorial Note

The Record of Actions for the 486th meeting of the National Security Council on June 29, 1961, "noted the President's approval of the Secretary of State's recommendation that the U.S. give full political and logistic support, if required, to the United Kingdom in connection with certain actions it is taking to forestall any Iraq attempt to take over Kuwait by force." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Rusk sent the following message to Lord Home following the meeting: "Thank you for your messages of yesterday and today. Your thinking coincides with ours. We understand the depth of your obligation, we agree that the independence of Kuwait must not be destroyed by force and we are prepared to render the full political support you request. We are communicating with Saud and we are considering the Security Council angle. While Qasim is, to say the least, unpredictable, we are hopeful that given time to work political forces among the Arabs will dissuade Qasim from committing himself to an unfortunate course of action with unpredictable consequences. We shall be very happy to keep in close touch with you on this." (Transmitted in telegram 6138 to London, June 29; *ibid.*, Central Files, 686D.87/6-2961)